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“Rights without Remedies”: Enforcing 
Employment Standards in Ontario by 
Maximizing Voice among Workers in 
Precarious Jobs
Leah f. vosko *
Workers in ontario, Canada are on the edge of a crisis in the enforcement of their minimum 
employment standards (ES). This crisis is shaped not only by well-documented deficiencies 
in the scope of labour protection but by the fact that the administration of the es system has 
not kept pace with the increasing number of workers and workplaces requiring protection 
under the province’s employment standards act. Coupled with an outmoded complaint-
based system, the dearth of support for es enforcement is cultivating a situation in which 
an unprecedented number of workers are bearers of rights without genuine opportunities 
for redress. Responding to this situation, this article explores how measures augmenting the 
voices of workers and their advocates could contribute to improving es enforcement in ontario. 
It does so through a review of innovative practices in other common law contexts characterized 
by similar enforcement regimes where labour market conditions have likewise deteriorated.  
Les travailleurs de l’ontario, au Canada, sont au bord de la crise en ce qui a trait au respect de 
leurs normes minimales d’emploi. Cette crise se dessine non seulement en raison de lacunes 
bien documentées dans le cadre de la protection des travailleurs, mais encore parce que 
l’administration du système des normes d’emploi n’a pas suivi le rythme de l’augmentation 
du nombre des travailleurs et des lieux de travail nécessitant une protection en vertu de la 
* York University. I am grateful to colleagues from the Cornell ILR School’s Women’s Writing 
Group, four anonymous reviewers, and Eric Tucker for their comments on an earlier version 
of this article as well as to John Grundy and Kim McIntyre for their research assistance. I also 
thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada’s standard research 
grants program and the Canada Research Chairs program for their financial support. An 
earlier version of this article was originally presented at the Voices At Work North American 
Workshop (16-17 March 2012), hosted at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 
Toronto and funded by the Leverhulme Trust, the Centre for Labour Management Relations 
at Ryerson University, and Osgoode Hall Law School.
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WORkERS in OntaRiO aRE On thE EdgE Of a cRiSiS in the enforcement of 
their minimum employment standards (ES). This crisis is shaped not only by 
well-documented deficiencies in the scope of labour protection but by the fact 
that the administration of the ES system has not kept pace with the increasing 
number of workers and workplaces requiring protection under the Employment 
Standards Act (ESA).1 The dearth of support for ES enforcement, coupled 
with an outmoded complaint-based system, is cultivating a situation in which 
an unprecedented number of workers are bearers of rights without genuine 
opportunities for redress.2 Indicative of the principally reactive approach to 
1. Employment Standards Act, 2000, SO 2000, c 41 [ESA].
2. Hence the allusion in the title of this article to “rights without remedies,” which refers to 
a comment made by former Ontario Minister of Labour, Chris Bentley. In 2004, shortly 
before departing from his post, Bentley noted that “[r]ights without remedies will not be 
rights for long … a new, more effective approach to enforcement of employment standards is 
long overdue.” See Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Hansard 38th Parl, 1st Sess (26 April 2004) 
at 1400 (Chris Bentley), online: <http://hansardindex.ontla.on.ca/hansardeissue/38-1/l037.
htm>.
Loi sur les normes d’emploi de la province. associé à un système désuet axé sur les plaintes, 
le peu de soutien au respect des normes d’emploi fait perdurer une situation où, même si un 
nombre sans précédent de travailleurs bénéficient de ces droits, ils n’ont pas véritablement 
l’occasion de les faire valoir. Réagissant à cette situation, le présent article passe en revue les 
pratiques novatrices mises de l’avant dans d’autres secteurs de la common law caractérisés 
par un régime semblable de contrôle d’application et où les conditions du marché du travail 
s’étaient également détériorées afin de déterminer si des mesures faisant mieux entendre 
la voix des travailleurs et de leurs défenseurs peuvent contribuer à améliorer le respect des 
normes d’emploi en ontario.
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enforcement, Ontario’s ES system is characterized by a backlog of unresolved 
claims, a complaint process resting on individual workers coming forward in an 
increasingly hostile environment, and an inspectorate unable to keep pace with 
regulatory provisions for proactive inspection. Giving workers and their advocates 
a stronger voice in ES enforcement is critical to ameliorating this mounting crisis. 
In response to this challenge, this article explores how measures that aug-
ment the voices of workers and their advocates could contribute to improving 
ES enforcement in Ontario. It does so through a review of innovative practices 
in other common law contexts characterized by similar enforcement regimes 
where labour market conditions have likewise deteriorated. Proceeding in four 
parts, the analysis begins in Part I with a description of how the concept of voice 
is employed herein, and its importance for workers in precarious jobs character-
ized by a lack of union representation. In studies of labour market regulation, 
voice is identified typically with union representation. An increasing number of 
workers for whom ES are the principal source of labour protection, however, do 
not have redress through unions and face other labour market insecurities. Many 
of these workers are also members of social groups confronting other challenges 
to realizing labour rights and protections (e.g., women, recent immigrants, 
temporary migrant workers, young people, et cetera). For such workers, a lack 
of union representation, together with other structural disadvantages, creates a 
climate in which violations, as well as practices evading and eroding workplace 
laws, are commonplace. 
Part II describes the crisis in ES enforcement in Ontario, focussing on the 
enforcement system’s primarily reactive or complaint-based orientation, and 
how this approach, which places the onus of enforcement in individual workers’ 
hands, mutes the voices of workers in precarious jobs. Part III canvasses practices 
in other jurisdictions that offer potential models for countering the degree of 
individualization faced by workers in Ontario in seeking to realize their ES 
rights and entitlements. In identifying innovations that give workers and their 
advocates a greater voice in enforcement, Part III provides examples of how 
state agencies, workers’ advocates (unions and community organizations), and 
partnerships between state agencies and workers’ advocates can support both 
individual workers and workers’ collective voice. Finally, bridging the critique 
of Ontario’s ES enforcement regime and the review of practices adopted else-
where, Part IV identifies voice mechanisms that offer promise in remedying the 
enforcement crisis in Ontario. 
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i. VOicE in thE REgULatiOn Of EMPLOYMEnt 
StandaRdS 
As it is used here, in relation to the topic of workplace regulation, voice entails 
the ability to pre-empt grievances in the workplace or to make such grievances 
effective (i.e., realize their effective remedy or resolution).3 In a broad sense, voice 
amounts to the capacity to speak and be heard as a member of the community of 
workers served by formal legal protections and the associated enforcement policies. 
Although there is a range of approaches to the study of voice, scholars in the 
traditions of political science and law typically see voice in the light of rights, 
linking it to humanism and industrial citizenship.4 As Adrian Wilkinson and 
Charles Fay note, “the concept of industrial democracy (which draws from notions of 
industrial citizenship) sees participation as a fundamental democratic right for work-
ers to extend a degree of control over managerial decision making.”5 Others add 
that free speech and human dignity have a place in the voice/participation matrix.6 
Complementing this approach, scholars in industrial relations conceive of 
voice in terms of representation. Here, analysts focus typically on power relations 
and control over the labour process in central institutions of labour market regula-
tion (especially collective bargaining structures) and view representation as key to 
countervailing power. They identify voice with democratic trade unions, which 
are seen as the primary agents for supporting workers in exercising their rights 
since they are independent and membership-based. Although there is growing 
acknowledgment of the need for representation among non-unionized workers 
3. Richard B Freeman & James L Medoff, What Do Unions Do? (New York: Basic Books, 1984) 
at 7-11; John W Budd, Paul J Gollan & Adrian Wilkinson, “New approaches to employee 
voice and participation in organizations” (2010) 63:3 Hum Rel 303; Tony Dundon et al, 
“The meanings and purpose of employee voice” (2004) 15:6 Int’l J Hum Res Mgmt 1149; 
Cynthia Estlund, “Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation” (2005) 
105:2 Colum L Rev 319.
4. HW Arthurs, “Developing Industrial Citizenship: A Challenge for Canada’s Second 
Century” (1967) 45:4 Can Bar Rev 786.
5. “New Times for Employee Voice?” (2011) 50:1 Hum Res Mgmt 65 at 67. 
6. See e.g. International Labour Organization, Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work, 86th session, Geneva (18 June 1998), online: <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/
standards/decl/declaration/index.htm>; John W Budd, Rafael Gomez & Noah M Meltz, 
“Why a Balance is Best: The Pluralist Industrial Relations Paradigm of Balancing Competing 
Interests” in Bruce E Kaufman, ed, Theoretical Perspectives on Work and the Employment 
Relationship (Champaign, Ill: Industrial Relations Research Association, 2004) 195 at 197-
98; Janice R Foley and Michael Polanyi, “Workplace Democracy: Why Bother?” (2006) 27:1 
Econ & Indus Democ 173. 
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in the face of declining rates of unionization, most scholarship in this tradition 
centres on those best able to express their workplace concerns.7 To this end, it 
also largely takes a particular employment model as given: the standard employment 
relationship,8 in which the worker works full-time and continuously for one employer 
on his or her premises under direct supervision, normally in a unionized situation, 
and has access to a social wage.9 Concomitantly, it assumes the native-born male 
industrial worker as its central subject. 
The focus of my inquiry, by contrast, is workers beyond those who are in a 
position to complain or to play the role of the protagonist10 in ES enforcement. It 
includes both workers who lack formal representation altogether and those who 
face other structural disadvantages inhibiting their access to representation.11 Its 
presumed subjects normally do not have access to union representation, which makes 
them dependent principally on ES rather than the often more favourable terms of 
collective agreements. They may also be disadvantaged with respect to the scope of 
labour protections provided via ES because of, in the case of gender relations, divi-
sions of paid and unpaid labour shaping men’s and women’s labour force status as 
well scheduling and work arrangements; in the case of immigration status, differential 
7. But see Vanessa Tait, Poor Workers’ Unions: rebuilding labor from below (Cambridge, Mass: 
South End Press, 2005); Jennifer Gordon, Suburban Sweatshops: The Fight for Immigrant 
Rights (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 2005); Janice Fine, Worker Centers: Organizing 
Communities at the Edge of the Dream (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).
8. Ulrich Mückenberger, “Non-standard forms of employment in the Federal Republic of 
Germany: The role and effectiveness of the State” in Gerry Rodgers & Janine Rodgers, eds, 
Precarious Jobs in Labour Market Regulation: The Growth of Atypical Employment in Western 
Europe (Geneva: International Labour Organization, International Institute for Labour 
Studies, 1989) 267 at 267-68.  
9. Freeman and Medoff cast unions alternatively as conduits, particularly for the expression 
of voice amongst “inframarginal” employees, since their compensation packages and job 
security are tied to length of service and, hence, the countervailing exit option is not 
desirable. See Freeman & Medoff, supra note 3. See also Albert O Hirschman, Exit, Voice, 
and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1970).
10. Eric Tucker, “Old Lessons for New Governance: Safety or Profit and the New Conventional 
Wisdom” in Theo Nichols & David Walters, eds, Governance, Change, and the Work 
Environment: Safety, Profit and the Conventional Wisdom (Amityville, NY: Baywood) at 27 
[forthcoming in 2013] [Tucker, “Old Lessons for New Governance”].   
11. Although it is beyond the scope of this investigation to engage extensively with scholarly 
literature on the impacts of neo-liberalism, it is worth emphasizing that the ranks of these 
two groups have swelled in recent decades with the transition from Keynesianism to neo-
liberalism. See e.g. Jamie Peck, Workfare States (New York: Guilford Press, 2001); Mark P 
Thomas, Regulating Flexibility: The Political Economy of Employment Standards (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009). 
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provision of rights and access to supports for citizens and permanent residents, 
temporary work permit holders, and non-status workers based on form of immi-
gration and duration of stay in the country; and, in the case of age, graduated 
social minima. Structural disadvantage may also relate to the overlapping issue 
of workers’ employment status and form of employment, since ES coverage 
pivots on the standard employment relationship. Distinctions between different 
employment statuses (self-employment or paid employment) and among forms 
of paid employment (part-time or full-time, temporary or permanent) operate to 
exclude certain categories of workers fully or partially from access to ES entitlements. 
Such exclusion can be by design, as is the case for the self-employed, or by implemen-
tation, as is the case with part-time and temporary employees unable to qualify for 
ES protections due to their hours of work or tenure in a single job.12
In defining ES-dependent workers, I therefore aim to encompass workers 
whose employment situations do not match the standard employment relation-
ship, a group that includes many women, immigrants, and young people. I also 
seek to include those whose connections to paid employment are, at times, tenuous 
due to circumstances linked to structural disadvantage as well as those who do not 
currently have a job since, in a complaint-based enforcement system of the sort 
operating in Ontario, workers are often in a position to complain only after they 
have left their jobs. In identifying actors and institutions with potential roles to 
play in representing ES-dependent workers, I correspondingly include workers’ 
advocates (e.g., legal case workers) and workers’ centres, which often identify 
more with community than with workplace concerns and typically take a holistic 
12. See generally Leah F Vosko, Temporary Work: The Gendered Rise of a Precarious Employment 
Relationship (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000); Judy Fudge, Eric Tucker & Leah 
Vosko, “The Legal Concept of Employment: Marginalizing Workers” (Originally prepared 
for the Law Commission of Canada, 25 October 2002), online: Government of Canada 
Publications <http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2007/lcc-cdc/JL2-35-2002E.
pdf> [Fudge, Tucker & Vosko, “The Legal Concept of Employment”]; Stephanie Bernstein, 
“Mitigating Precarious Employment in Quebec: The Role of Minimum Employment 
Standards Legislation” in Leah F Vosko, ed, Precarious Employment: Understanding Labour 
Market Insecurity in Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006) 221 [Vosko, 
Precarious Employment]; Katherine Lippel, “Precarious Employment and Occupational 
Health and Safety Regulation in Quebec” in Vosko, Precarious Employment (ibid) 241; Eric 
Tucker, “Will the Vicious Circle of Precariousness be Unbroken? The Exclusion of Ontario 
Farm Workers from the Occupational Health and Safety Act” [Tucker, “Vicious Circle of 
Precariousness”] in Vosko, Precarious Employment (ibid) 256; Leah F Vosko, “Precarious 
Employment: Towards an Improved Understanding of Labour Market Insecurity” [Vosko, 
“Labour Market Insecurity”] in Vosko, Precarious Employment (ibid) 3; Leah F Vosko, 
Managing the Margins: Gender, Citizenship, and the International Regulation of Precarious 
Employment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) [Vosko, Managing the Margins].
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approach to the experiences of working people due to the constituencies they 
support.13 Workers’ centres and workers’ advocates may be focused not only on narrow 
workplace issues but on broader social and economic concerns linked to processes of 
social reproduction. For this reason, they may be uniquely positioned to observe 
systematic tendencies, including the fact that “the current [individualized 
rights-based model for enforcing ES in Ontario] … sets different de facto 
standards of legal compliance for employers of low-wage earners versus high-
wage earners”14 because the low waged do not earn enough to receive adequate 
legal support. Workers’ centres and workers’ advocates may also be well-situated 
to assist ES-dependent workers in actualizing their rights through broad-based 
strategies that extend beyond particular workplaces.
Enabling more workers to exercise voice in ES enforcement requires a greater 
plurality of mechanisms for redress for those facing violations and other forms of 
evasive behaviour, as well as an expanded group of actors and institutions upon 
whom they can rely for support.
ii. EMPLOYMEnt StandaRdS EnfORcEMEnt in OntaRiO 
ES are legislated standards setting minimum terms and conditions of employment 
in areas such as wages, working time, vacations, public holidays, equal pay for 
equal work, leaves of absence, and termination and severance of employment. 
They are meant to serve as the floor of workplace protection for most workers in 
a labour market, but they are the main source of protection for workers in non-
unionized jobs. Despite their significance for the over six million workers in the 
over 370,000 workplaces in Ontario, a large body of literature reveals gaps in 
the scope of coverage under the ESA. These shortcomings are acute for workers 
in precarious jobs, which typically involve forms of employment differing from 
the standard employment relationship. Existing studies reveal a misfit between 
coverage under the ESA and solo self-employment, part-time employment, and 
temporary paid employment—forms of employment in which workers often 
experience high levels of uncertainty, low income, a lack of access to regulatory 
13. See Cynthia J Cranford et al, “Thinking through Community Unionism” in Vosko, 
Precarious Employment (supra note 12) 353; Janice Fine, “A Marriage Made in Heaven?: 
Mismatches and Misunderstandings between Worker Centres and Unions” (2007) 45:2 Brit 
J Indus Rel 335. See also Simon J Black, “Community Unionism: A Strategy for Organizing 
in the New Economy” (2005) 14: 3 New Lab Forum 24. 
14. Samuel Estreicher & Zev J Eigen, “The forum for adjudication of employment disputes” in 
Cynthia L Estlund & Michael L Wachter, eds, Research Handbook on the Economics of Labor 
and Employment Law (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2010) 409 at 414.  
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protection, and limited control over the labour process.15 Another significant area 
of weakness under the ESA relates to enforcement. Although the limited resources 
devoted to enforcement affect all workers covered by the ESA,16 the enforcement 
gap is particularly significant for workers in precarious jobs, including those who 
may technically be covered by its provisions but are not in a position to access 
their rights. This less well-studied contemporary gap is the focus of this Part.17  
a. thE ExiSting MachinERY18
In Ontario, workers’ access to ES depends on the Ministry of Labour’s (MOL) 
ability to oversee their implementation, since this branch of government is 
mandated to administer, enforce, and promote compliance with the ESA and 
15. See Vosko, “Labour Market Insecurity,” supra note 12; Fudge, Tucker & Vosko, “The 
Legal Concept of Employment,” supra note 12; Judy Fudge & Leah F Vosko, “Gender, 
Segmentation, and the Standard Employment Relationship in Canadian Labour Law, 
Legislation and Policy” (2001) 22:2 Econ & Indus Democ 271; Bernstein, supra note 12; 
Tucker, “Vicious Circle of Precariousness,” supra note 12; Andrea M Noack & Leah F 
Vosko, “Precarious Jobs in Ontario: Mapping Dimensions of Labour Market Insecurity by 
Workers’ Social Location and Context” Law Commission of Ontario, Vulnerable Workers 
and Precarious Work Project (2011), online: <http://www.lco-cdo.org/vulnerable-workers-
commissioned-papers-vosko-noack.pdf>. 
16. Attesting to the magnitude of this gap, the number of workers covered by the ESA increased 
between 1997 and 2007 by 24 per cent. Over the same period, funding for the ES Program 
decreased by 33 per cent. Indeed, even significant increases in 2009–2010, flowing from the 
provincial government’s recognition of the problem, leave funding levels over ten per cent 
below 1997 levels without adjusting for inflation. See Leah F Vosko et al, “New Approaches 
to Enforcement and Compliance with Labour Regulatory Standards: The Case of Ontario, 
Canada” Law Commission of Ontario, Vulnerable Workers and Precarious Work Project 
(2011) at 30, online: <http://www.lco-cdo.org/vulnerable-workers-commissioned-papers-
vosko-tucker-thomas-gellatly.pdf> [Vosko et al, “New Approaches to Enforcement”].
17. For a detailed history of Ontario’s ES regime, documenting the contemporary shift from 
a Keynesian emphasis on welfarism, under which ES were understood as minimum floor 
and enforced largely through proactive measures, to a neoliberal emphasis on “regulated 
flexibility” characterized by a move to a reactive model, see Thomas, supra note 11. On the 
administration of the ESA at its inception, see Marion E Lane, Administration in Action: An 
Institutional Analysis of the Ontario Employment Standards Branch (LLM Thesis, University of 
California at Berkeley, 1977) [unpublished].
18. The following discussion of the enforcement machinery in Ontario draws partly on data 
collected for a report prepared for the Law Commission of Ontario of which I am a co-
author. See Vosko et al, “New Approaches to Enforcement,” supra note 16. I thank Mary 
Gellatly, Mark Thomas, and Eric Tucker for permitting me to use this material in preparing 
this section of this article as well as for encouraging me to prepare this stand-alone piece, 
expanding one of my own contributions to that Report—namely, its survey of enforcement 
practices in other jurisdictions.
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its regulations. Under the ESA, Employment Standards Officers (ESOs) and the 
Director of Employment Standards have considerable powers of investigation 
(e.g., to enter business premises and requisition records for inspection). ESOs also 
have a great deal of leeway in resolving complaints of violations. Enforcement tools 
include the precipitation of settlements, orders to pay, fines, compliance orders, and 
prosecutions. The level of discretion accorded to ESOs and other officials responsible 
for enforcement makes this arena of workplace regulation fertile ground for the 
investigation of mechanisms for augmenting workers’ voice. 
In the face of limited legislative direction, Ontario’s ES enforcement regime 
amounts to a reactive system supplemented by voluntary compliance and pro-
active measures.19 The bulk of the MOL’s enforcement efforts depend on worker 
complaints to trigger regulatory intervention, and they emphasize negotiated 
settlements, principally using coercive measures such as orders to pay and, in 
egregious cases, prosecution.20 When measures promoting voluntary compliance 
19. Although reactive approaches are most prevalent in ES enforcement, and hence the focus 
of this section, the MOL uses voluntary and proactive approaches selectively. Among its 
strategies of voluntary compliance, it operates a call centre, the Employment Standards 
Information Centre, assisting callers with questions about the ESA, and it provides multi-
lingual interpreters. The call centre does not provide legal advice. It received almost 350,000 
calls in 2009–2010. Staff members also answer emails from workers and employers; indeed, 
they prepared nine thousand responses in 2009–2010. See Vosko et al, “New Approaches 
to Enforcement,” supra note 16 at 15. Additionally, the MOL website includes tutorials 
explaining provisions of the ESA, how they apply to workers and employers, how to file a 
claim, and videos demonstrating to employers what they are to expect in cases of inspection 
and describing to workers what they are to expect upon filing a claim. Among its proactive 
strategies, the MOL uses targeted inspections and enlarged investigations in select instances 
of when violations are detected. See Ontario Ministry of Labour, Administration Manual 
for Employment Standards (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Labour, 2010) at ch 4 [copy 
on file with the author] [MOL, Administration Manual]. Expanded investigations are 
most common; in such instances a workplace is identified for investigation based on the 
results found during an individual claim investigation. Notably, resources devoted to such 
inspections pale in comparison to those devoted to the reactive system. In 2009–2010, for 
example, the MOL conducted ninety-nine expanded investigations in contrast to 20,762 
individual claims investigations. See Ontario Ministry of Labour, Employment Standards 
Program Annual Report, 2009-2010 (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Labour, 2010) [copy on 
file with the author].
20. On the notion of reactive enforcement, as well as how it operates in other jurisdictions, 
see Glenda Maconachie & Miles Goodwin, “Recouping wage underpayment: increasingly 
less likely?” (2006) 41:3 Aust J Soc Issues 327; Federal Labour Standards Review, “New 
compliance strategies: ‘Hard law’ approach” by Paul Leonard Gallina (Human Resources 
Development Canada, 2005), online: <http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/labour/employment_
standards/fls/pdf/research20.pdf>; National Employment Law Project, Winning Wage Justice: 
An Advocate’s Guide to State and City Policies to Fight Wage Theft (January 2011) at 57-58, 
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are unsuccessful, individual workers must first seek a remedy from their employer 
and, when such efforts fail to produce results, they may file a claim with the 
MOL for unpaid wages and other ES entitlements. Typically, complaints initiate 
an investigation, which may lead to prosecution and penalties for employers and 
settlements for workers. Upon the introduction of an online claims process in 2006–
2007, the MOL posted a self-help kit designed to assist workers in learning about 
their ESA entitlements, determining which ES had been violated, and calculating the 
amount of unpaid wages owed to them in cases of violations. This kit then instructed 
workers first to contact their employer to obtain wages and entitlements owing.
Through such investigative processes, typically 80 per cent of claims are ‘resolved,’ 
a percentage encompassing claims withdrawn by the claimant, settled by workers and 
their employers directly, complied with by employers (i.e., where an ESO determina-
tion finds the employer in violation), or denied.21 In fewer than 20 per cent of cases, 
the ESO issues an order to pay, which claimants and employers have a right to 
appeal to the Ontario Labour Relations Board (although few take this route). In the 
majority of cases that are settled, any orders respecting employers’ contraventions are 
void22; many employer contraventions of the ESA are thereby erased from public view 
through processes of negotiating, promoting, or brokering of settlement agreements 
formerly prohibited.23 Furthermore, in cases where settlements are not reached and 
the ESO resumes the investigation and decision-making, if an employer voluntarily 
complies with the ESO’s decision that an ES entitlement must be provided to a 
claimant, the employer is required to pay either what he or she technically owes the 
worker or less24 when a lower settlement is accepted.25 
online: <http://www.nelp.org/page/-/Justice/2011/WinningWageJustice2011.pdf?nocdn=1>. 
21. Workers Action Centre & Employment Standards Work Group, Modernizing Part III of 
the Canada Labour Code, (submitted to the Federal Labour Standards Review Commission, 
October 2005), online: <http://www.workersactioncentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/
pb_Modernizing_eng.pdf>.
22. Mary Gellatly et al, “‘Modernizing’ Employment Standards?: Administrative Efficiency and 
the Production of the Illegitimate Claimant in Ontario, Canada” (2011) 22:2 Econ & Lab 
Rel Rev 81. 
23. MOL, Administration Manual, supra note 19, s 5.6.14. 
24. A pilot project of facilitated settlements conducted after the introduction of the Open for 
Business Act, 2010 found that 21 per cent of cases that went to a decision-making meeting 
were resolved through settlements and that these cases resulted in settlements of, on average, 
17 per cent lower than what was assessed to be owed by the ESO. See Ontario Ministry 
of Labour, Meeting with Workers’ Action Centre & Parkdale Community Legal Services, 
Employment Practices Branch “ES Modernization Progress Update” [copy on file with the 
author], cited in Vosko et al, “New Approaches to Enforcement,” supra note 16 at 18, n 50.
25. Furthermore, when an ES complaint is settled without the issuance of an order to pay, there 
can be no fines levied through contravention notices.
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When sanctions are deemed appropriate, the ESA sets out a variety of options, 
including orders to pay wages and to reinstate workers as well as prosecution, but 
there are no criteria for the use of such sanctions and penalties. A key component 
of ES enforcement is the recovery of wages and other monies owed to work-
ers. Collections, however, represent a challenging facet of enforcement since 
a substantial amount of the monies owed to workers are from employers who 
are insolvent or bankrupt, a category that grew dramatically in the 2008–2009 
recession,26 and since the MOL has privatized some of its collection activities.27 
B. WORkER VOicE in a naRROWLY REactiVE REgiME: thE PERiLS Of 
indiVidUaLiZatiOn
Despite the focus on worker claims of ES violations, the reactive system impedes 
worker voice in many ways. The majority of resources for enforcing ES in On-
tario are devoted to investigating individual complaints of employer violations 
even though, as Ron Saunders and Patrice Dutil note, “dealing with compliance 
one case at a time is expensive and risks overloading the available capacity.”28 
Indicative of the problem of overloaded capacity, there was a backlog of fourteen 
thousand complaints as of 2010. In response, the MOL pledged to eliminate 
this backlog by March 2012. However, due to the extra resources required to 
fulfill this objective, following its elimination, the MOL promised to pre-empt 
future backlogs through an “enhanced compliance strategy … reaching out to 
employers through a mix of education, outreach and enforcement to … stem any 
problems before they arise.”29 
26. Vosko et al, “New Approaches to Enforcement,” supra note 16 at 22. In such instances, 
recovery of, for example, unpaid wages is difficult because workers are typically one of several 
creditors’ owed money and are paid subject to priority ranking as determined by federal 
bankruptcy and insolvency legislation. Here, the MOL assists employees by filing Proofs of 
Claim with the Trustee in Bankruptcy or the Monitor.
27. This situation has led the Office of the Auditor General of Ontario to characterize weaknesses 
in the collections of amounts in default owed to workers by employers as a major problem 
with the ES regime. Office of the Auditor General of Ontario, 2004 Annual Report (30 
November 2004) at 240, online: <http://www.auditor.on.ca/en/reports_en/en04/309en04.
pdf http://www.auditor.on.ca/en/reports_2004_en.htm> [Auditor General of Ontario, 2004 
Annual Report]; Office of the Auditor General of Ontario, 2006 Annual Report (5 December 
2006), at 311, online: <http://www.auditor.on.ca/en/reports_en/en06/409en06.pdf>. 
28. “New Approaches in Achieving Compliance with Statutory Employment Standards” 
Canadian Policy Research Network & The Institute of Public Administration of Canada 
(July 2005) at 2, online: <http://www.cprn.org/documents/37835_en.pdf>. 
29. Ontario Ministry of Labour, Employment Standards: Ministry Successes (29 July 2011), online: 
<http://www.labour.gov.on.ca/english/news/nr_esenforcement110729.php>.
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As for the process of complaints resolution, enforcement also falls largely in 
the hands of individual workers who face numerous barriers in pursuing claims. 
The individual claims-making process inhibits workers who remain on the job 
(and aim to maintain their present job) from making claims because there is 
no provision for anonymous or confidential complaints, or for complaints filed 
by third parties. Nor is interim reinstatement pending investigation available to 
fired workers, even though it is available to unionized workers under the Ontario 
Labour Relations Act30 in certain circumstances. For workers who opt to complain 
while they are still on the job, anti-reprisal provisions apply. Yet even though such 
provisions place the burden of proof on the employer, this burden only applies 
to a finite set of circumstances despite the wide-ranging forms retaliation may 
take.31 Given such barriers, nine out of ten workers file ES claims after they have 
left the job.32 
In addition to obstacles acute among workers in precarious jobs, such as the 
inability to survive on unemployment insurance benefits of 55 per cent (the cur-
rent replacement rate) of already meagre earnings if they lose their jobs due to 
retaliation (and if they qualify), workers reliant on ES protections also face barriers 
related to their social location. Workers’ immigration status is a case in point. Under 
federal immigration policy, many workers migrating under Canada’s temporary and 
temporary-to-permanent immigration programs33 are required to hold employment 
30. Labour Relations Act, 1995, SO 1995, ch 1, Schedule A. 
31. According to the Employment Standards Act, the burden of proof applies if the employee:
(i) asks the employer to comply with this Act and the regulations, 
(ii) makes inquiries about his or her rights under this Act, 
(iii) files a complaint with the Ministry under this Act, 
(iv) exercises or attempts to exercise a right under this Act, 
(v) gives information to an employment standards officer, 
(vi) testifies or is required to testify or otherwise participates or is going to participate in a 
proceeding under this Act, 
(vii) participates in proceedings respecting a by-law or proposed by-law under section 4 of 
the Retail Business Holidays Act, 
(viii) is or will become eligible to take a leave, intends to take a leave or takes a leave under 
Part XIV.
 See ESA, supra note 1, s 74(1)(a). 
32. Auditor General of Ontario, 2004 Annual Report, supra note 27 at 242.
33. Attesting to the growing significance of temporary and temporary-to-permanent immigration 
programs in Canada, between 1987 and 2011, the number of temporary migrant workers 
grew from 131,752 to 446,847, over 67,000 of which resided in Ontario. See Citizenship 
and Immigration Canada, Research and Evaluation Branch, “Facts and Figures 2011—
Immigration Overview: Permanent and Temporary Residents,” online: <http://www.cic.
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for a specified period, often with a specific employer. For example, temporary 
migrant workers who work, often year after year, under the Seasonal Agricultural 
Workers Program and the Low-Skill Temporary Foreign Worker Program are tied 
normally to one employer for a specific term. These workers have the same rights 
to ES as other workers. However, workers with insecure immigration status who 
face substandard conditions of employment are rarely in a position to complain 
due to implicit or explicit threats that they will be penalized by the immigration 
system (e.g., with deportation). 
For those workers willing to take the risk to raise their voice, the complaint 
process is riddled with obstacles, especially for those in precarious jobs who confront 
other structural disadvantages. In practice, both the step initially recommended 
in the self-help kit, and made mandatory for most workers under the Open for 
Business Act, 2010,34 that workers first seek compliance from employers before 
being permitted to file an ES claim, and the requirement, also introduced by this 
legislation, that workers provide information in writing sufficient for the case to 
proceed, make many uninformed assumptions about the situation of workers 
reliant on ES. They presume that ES-dependent workers have access to the inter-
net (given that the MOL’s website is the primary source of knowledge about ESA 
rights),35 strong English language skills,36 high levels of literacy (at a minimum, 
a level sufficient to submit a lengthy claim form, requiring extensive narrative 
gc.ca/english/pdf/research-stats/facts2011.pdf>.
34. Open for Business Act, 2010, SO 2010, c 16, amending Employment Standards Act, 2000, 
SO 2000, c 41 [Open for Business Act]. The exceptions are young workers, live-in caregivers, 
people with language barriers or a disability, workers who are afraid to contact the employer, 
workers with non-monetary complaints, workers approaching the six month time limit, or 
workers whose employer has closed or gone bankrupt.
35. Reliance on internet access creates significant barriers for many people that are structurally 
disadvantaged. Statistics Canada reports that if someone is poor, older, lives in a rural 
community, was born outside of Canada, and/or has relatively low levels of education, he or 
she is less likely to use or have use of the internet. See Statistics Canada, Canadian Internet 
Use Survey (12 June 2008), online: <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/080612/
dq080612b-eng.htmhttp://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/080612/dq080612b-eng.
htm>.
36. According to one study, as many as half a million people in Ontario may need an interpreter 
in pursuing legal matters. Yet no language interpretation services are provided to workers who 
require them in the ES claims process. See Karen Cohl & George Thomson, “Connecting 
Across Language and Distance: Linguistic and Rural Access to Legal Information and 
Services” The Law Foundation of Ontario, Linguistic and Rural Access to Justice Project 
(December 2008) at 13, online: <http://www.lawfoundation.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/The-
Connecting-Report.pdf>.
(2013) 50 osgoode Hall law Journal858
accounts in writing, to initiate investigation),37 and knowledge of how highly 
complex legal rights apply to their own conditions of work.38 The newly intro-
duced information requirement also stands in stark contrast to the previous process 
of claims investigation. Prior to the introduction of the Open for Business Act, when 
a worker filed a claim, an ESO investigated whether or not, and if so, which, ES 
violations had taken place by seeking information from both the claimant and 
the employer through telephone calls, letters, and fact-finding meetings in which 
both parties were given the opportunity to present their cases. The ESO then 
evaluated evidence provided by the employer and the employee and made a 
determination. ESOs could thus gather evidence in ways attentive to barriers 
faced by workers in precarious jobs. Furthermore, the introduction of an 
information requirement is paradoxical as it was accompanied by a legislative 
change granting ESOs greater leeway in dealing with undue delays by allowing 
them to make determinations based upon the best information available.39  
Heightening these voice problems, ES are alone among workplace regulations 
conferring employment rights in that they provide for no government or quasi-
government funded assistance for workers who perceive their rights to have been 
violated. The MOL and other government agencies provide funding for informa-
tion, education, and legal support in areas of health and safety, workplace safety 
and insurance, and human rights (e.g., Occupational Health Clinics for Ontario 
Workers, Office of the Worker Advisor, Human Rights Legal Support Centre). 
Yet few legal supports exist for workers pursuing claims under the ESA, who 
also have limited representational routes for voicing their experiences. Ontario’s 
Community Legal Clinic system provided ESA representation in eighty-six cases, 
ninety brief services, and advice for just over 850 workers in 2008.40 There are 
37. To access the ES claim form online, see Ontario Ministry of Labour, Form: Employment 
Standards Claim (January 2011), online: <http://www.labour.gov.on.ca/english/es/forms/
claim.php>. There is a link between literacy and social location. For example, “individuals 
with low literacy skills” tend to be “older, less educated, immigrants or ha[ve] a mother 
tongue other than English or French.” See Statistics Canada, International Adult Literacy 
Survey: Learning Literacy in Canada: Evidence from the International Survey of Reading Skills 
by S Grenier et al, Catalogue no 89-552-MIE—No 19 (January 2008) at 37, online: <http://
www.nald.ca/library/research/stats/llc/llc.pdf>.  
38. Gellatly et al, supra note 22 at 93. 
39. See ESA, supra note 1, ss 102.1(1)-(3).
40. See Soyini Barrington, Policy and Research, Legal Aid Ontario (9 July 2009) [copy on file 
with the author], cited in Vosko et al, “New Approaches to Enforcement,” supra note 16 at 
35, n 82. For an informative parallel study addressing the issue of wage recovery in Australia 
and demonstrating the importance of legal support services in fostering access to justice 
among workers, see Chris Arup & Carolyn Sutherland, “The Recovery of Wages: Legal 
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no legal aid certificates for ESA matters. The $10,000 cap on ESA claims also 
means that few lawyers in the private bar can afford to represent workers. And 
the time limit of six months to file a claim makes the meagre compensation available 
to aggrieved workers highly time sensitive. In each of these ways, the ES enforcement 
system thwarts worker voice in the claims-making process, a profound limitation for 
those who rely on the ESA as their principal source of labour protection.
iii. aMPLifYing WORkERS’ VOicE: SURVEYing innOVatiVE 
EnfORcEMEnt EffORtS
The growing crisis of ES enforcement in Ontario stems from its narrow reactive 
regime, which places the onus of enforcement principally on individual workers 
without giving them meaningful voice by making available appropriate supports 
in the complaints process and making possible greater involvement of key actors 
across the enforcement regime (e.g., in pursuing investigations and inspections 
and in determining penalties and settlements). Although there are promises and 
pitfalls in transplanting approaches from one jurisdiction to another,41 as an 
extensive body of literature in comparative law and comparative labour law 
illustrates, innovative initiatives operating in other common law contexts character-
ized by broadly similar political cultures and legal traditions offer insight into 
countering the deficiencies that characterize Ontario’s ES enforcement regime.42 
Services and Access to Justice” (2009) 35 Monash UL Rev 96.
41. A range of commentators have contributed to the transplantability debate in comparative 
law and comparative labour law, including Bob Hepple, Otto Kahn-Freund, Pierre Legrand, 
and Alan Watson. Some such authors suggest, quite contentiously, that legal transplants 
are common and easy to implement socially (Watson), whereas others contend, more 
moderately, that transferability is best approached as a continuum (Kahn-Freund). Still 
others argue that genuine transplantation is difficult to achieve due to cultural and historical 
factors (Legrand). In an extensive review of the central debates on legal transplantability in 
comparative law and comparative labour law outlining these distinct positions, Anthony 
Forsyth demonstrates, building on Gunther Teubner’s interventions, that transplantation 
is possible with thoughtful consideration of the interaction between law and various social 
systems. See Anthony Forsyth, “The ‘Transplantability’ Debate in Comparative Law and 
Comparative Labour Law: Implications for Australian Borrowing from European Labour 
Law” (Working Paper No 38, Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law, The 
University of Melbourne, June 2006) at 2-22, online: <http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/
files/dmfile/wp381.pdf>. Although I do not delve deeply into such debates in this article, 
informed by their contours, I take a similar position. I thereby pursue a survey of innovative 
enforcement initiatives drawn from other common law contexts-sharing important features 
with Ontario, focusing principally on their tenor. 
42. It is nevertheless important to preface the survey I undertake below by emphasizing that 
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Such initiatives fall into two (often mutually-reinforcing) categories: those sup-
porting individual voice and those supporting collective voice. The first category 
includes initiatives directed principally at improving workers’ access to complaints 
processes, including those where institutions or groups support individuals in 
making complaints. The second includes initiatives boosting the involvement of 
groups of workers and workers’ advocates in the overall enforcement process.43 
In the collective voice category, the diversity of actors and institutions involved 
justifies the examples chosen for review given the goal of highlighting examples 
where enforcement is not left exclusively to individual workers but, rather, shared 
amongst multiple government agencies and external institutions.
a. innOVatiOnS SUPPORting indiVidUaL WORkERS’ VOicE
In the context of a largely reactive regime, one avenue for improving the situation 
of workers is to maximize routes to the documentation of complaints. Specifically, 
permitting anonymous, confidential, and third-party complaints, in relevant pro-
visions of legislation or through administrative protocols, offers possibilities for 
decreasing the burden on individual workers while giving voice to their experiences.
Anonymous complaints are desirable since they provide the most protec-
tion for workers still on the job. Through administrative means, the province of 
Saskatchewan allows “the employee or a third party such as a parent, friend or a 
member of the community” to submit a written claim against an employer, which 
the Compliance and Review Unit then investigates.44 The anonymous complaint 
option is available if the worker is still employed at the workplace, believes that 
provisions of the province’s Labour Standards Act45 are not being followed, and 
wants to seek redress but is not in a position to file a formal complaint.46 Only 
written complaints with supporting evidence are reviewed. The Compliance and 
political and social systems, as well as contexts, matter: In the common law jurisdictions 
under study, different circumstances motivated the initiatives that I canvass. For example, 
in the United States, historically low rates of unionization are at the root of some leading 
federal enforcement strategies. Distinctly, in Australia, several of the enforcement measures 
I explore reflect the attempt by a new Labor government to in some way compensate for the 
decollectivization and decentralization of labour relations occurring prior to its rise to power.
43. In the ensuing discussion, as well as in Part IV, below, the distinction between supporting 
individual and collective voice is therefore used principally for heuristic purposes. 
44. Saskatchewan Ministry of Labour Relations and Workplace Safety, Labour Standards 
Division, Anonymous Complaint Form at 1, online: <http://www.lrws.gov.sk.ca/
anonymous-third-party-complaint-form>. 
45. Labour Standards Act, RSS 1978, c L-1. 
46. However, employees seeking wage recovery must file a formal complaint personally.
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Review Unit also pursues expanded investigations in such cases.47 This approach is 
indicative of how, in practice, some initiatives oriented to individuals can contribute 
to benefits for groups of workers and prepare the ground for improvements to 
collective voice. For example, where a claim submitted by a worker is found to apply 
to more than one worker at the worksite, the Ministry will expand their inspection to 
protect all workers present.48 
There are also provisions for anonymous complaints in six American states: 
Colorado, New Jersey, California, Connecticut, Illinois, and New York.49 As in 
Saskatchewan, provisions of these state laws or administrative measures could be 
strengthened by allowing the claimant to write “anonymous” on written forms 
rather than requiring that the name of the claimant be listed with the promise 
that the claim will be treated anonymously. 
More modestly, the province of British Columbia50 and nine American 
states51 permit confidential complaints, which keep the identity of the worker 
unknown to the best of investigators’ ability during the investigation process. 
The Fair Work Ombudsman, an agency responsible for enforcing Australia’s 
Fair Work Act,52 is also willing to receive calls from any party who wishes to 
complain about an alleged breach of Commonwealth workplaces laws,53 but it 
does not guarantee complainants that it will be able to maintain their confiden-
tiality during the course of an investigation.54 In the United States, sixteen states 
permit workers to designate another person to bring an unpaid wages lawsuit 
on their own behalf or on behalf of other workers who have similar claims, 
and seven states allow organizations and individuals, including fellow work-
47. Saskatchewan Ministry of Labour Relations and Workplace Safety, supra note 44.
48. The Employment Protection for Foreign Nationals Act (Live-in Caregivers and Others), 2009, 
which extends select labour protections outside the ESA to a group of temporary migrant 
workers in jobs known to be highly precarious, also includes provisions for an ESO to meet 
with any person who may have contravened the Act, if he or she “acquires information” that 
suggests this possibility (i.e., if the ESO receives anonymous tips). See Employment Protection 
for Foreign Nationals Act (Live-in Caregivers and Others), 2009, SO 2009, c 32, ss 22(1)-(3).
49. National Employment Law Project, supra note 20 at 58.
50. Employment Standards Act, RSBC 1996, c 113, s 75(1).
51. These states are Arizona, Arkansas, Kentucky, Ohio, Illinois, Nebraska, New Jersey, North 
Carolina, and New York. See National Employment Law Project, supra note 20 at 58. 
Among these states, NY Lab § 196-A extends the strongest protections to workers. 
52. Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) [Fair Work Act]. 
53. Commonwealth of Australia, Fair Work Ombudsman, Workplace Complaint Form User 
Guide, online: <www.fairwork.gov.au/Complaints1/Workplace-Complaint-Form-User-
Guide.pdf> [Accessed 2 March 2012].
54. Commonwealth of Australia, Fair Work Ombudsman, Workplace Complaint Form, online: 
<http://www.fairwork.gov.au/Complaints1/Workplace-Complaint-Form.pdf>.
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ers in the same workplace, to file complaints on behalf of affected workers.55 
Even under Australia’s new centralized system of industrial relations in which unions 
have diminished power, the Fair Work Act also gives unions the right to bring court 
proceedings in relation to ES violations experienced by individual workers if they 
are entitled to represent the employee in question.56 If the violation relates to a 
workplace agreement or workplace determination that binds the union, the union 
can also make an application in its own right, on behalf of an employee, or both.57 
Anonymous, confidential, and third-party complaints thereby contribute to 
alleviating risks for workers and create conditions conducive to the exercise of 
voice. They also convey to employers and government officials the message that 
coworkers and worker representatives form a larger community in which workers 
(especially those in relatively secure employment) act as other workers’ (especially 
the precariously employed) keepers, highlighting, once again, important linkages 
between improving individual and collective voice.
A presumption of employer retaliation is another tool for lessening potential 
harm to workers opting to complain or permitting claims to go forward on their 
behalf. This protective device involves creating “a legal protection that any adverse 
or discriminatory action taken by an employer against the worker within a certain 
period of time after the worker [or another permitted party] complains will be 
presumed to be retaliatory.”58 Such provisions simultaneously make it easier for 
55. National Employment Law Project, supra note 20 at 58.
56. On the content of these standards and the shift to the Fair Work Act, see Vosko, Managing the 
Margins, supra note 12 at 115-17.
57. John Howe, Nicole Yazbek & Sean Cooney, “Study on Labour Inspection Sanctions and 
Remedies: The case of Australia,” Working Document No 14 (Geneva: International 
Labour Organization, Labour Administration and Inspection Programme, March 2011) 
at 32, online: <http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/---lab_admin/
documents/publication/wcms_154066.pdf> [Howe, Yazbek & Cooney, “Labour Inspection 
Sanctions and Remedies”]. There nevertheless remain significant barriers to union 
participation in enforcement in Australia, including constraints on unions’ rights of entry to 
investigate suspected violations and/or hold meetings with employees, for which they now 
require a permit, which was not the case under a previous regime. See Vosko, Managing the 
Margins, supra note 12 at ch 4, 6. On the enforcement rights of unions in the Australian 
system more generally, see Tess Hardy & John Howe, “Partners in Enforcement? The New 
Balance Between Government and Trade Union Enforcement of Employment Standards in 
Australia” (2009) 22 Aust J Lab L 306. Furthermore, under the Fair Work Act, the fact that 
the Fair Work Ombudsman now has the responsibility for enforcing its terms, including its 
intention to control unlawful union activity, such as strikes, could compromise the working 
relationship between the Fair Work Ombudsman and unions and thereby undermine 
collaborative efforts to address compliance. See Howe, Yazbek & Cooney, “Labour Inspection 
Sanctions and Remedies” (ibid) at 32-33. 
58. National Employment Law Project, supra note 20 at 60 [emphasis in original].
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workers to bring forward cases of retaliation and simultaneously empower labour 
inspectors to investigate such claims. They also place the burden of proof on 
employers. Although few pure examples exist, a provision in New York’s Wage Theft 
Prevention Act59 provides enhanced rules against retaliation, by including threats as a 
form of retaliation and especially by making it illegal for any person to retaliate and 
by providing for greater damages.60
Further strategies for empowering individual workers in enforcement processes 
include outreach activities on the part of labour inspectorates, which assist workers 
in finding and using their voices by bringing state personnel into workplaces in 
non-confrontational situations to introduce workers and employers to minimum 
labour standards and to explain the inspectorate’s role in enforcement. These out-
reach activities make state services and supports more accessible to those unfamiliar 
with their workplace rights or with available complaints mechanisms, or to those 
fearful of approaching enforcement officers. In the United States, such strategies have 
grown measurably at the federal level in the last decade. They include efforts tailored 
to ethnic communities, such as the Compliance Outreach to the Asian Community 
and Hispanics (COACH), through which the Northern New Jersey Office of the 
federal Wage and Hour Division visits and works directly with groups of workers and 
employers historically reluctant to use its services and introduces them to wage and 
hours laws through publications and other educational services. They also encompass 
the Rapid Employee Assistance in Chinese Hotline, a telephone hotline geared to 
answer questions about employment laws from Chinese-speaking workers in New 
York. These two examples predate the public awareness campaign known as “We Can 
Help,” launched by the Wages and Hours Division in April 2010. Through this pro-
gram, the agency is attempting to connect the precariously employed with its services 
via collaboration with local worker advocacy and interfaith organizations, to enhance 
its presence and improve in-person assistance in complaints processes.61 
59. Wage Theft Prevention Act, c 564, § 8380 (McKinney 2010) (available on WL).
60. In publicizing this provision of the Act, the New York State Department of Labor notes that 
this protection: 
[A]pplies to any worker who alleges that the employer has done something that the employee 
thinks breaks a Labor Law or an Order issued by the Commissioner. This applies even if the em-
ployee is mistaken about the law, if they acted in good faith and even if the employee does not 
cite a specific part of the Labor Law. This law protects employees even if the employer incor-
rectly believes they made a complaint. 
 See New York State Department of Labor, Wage Theft Prevention Act Fact Sheet (2011) at 1 
[emphasis in original], online: <http://www.labor.ny.gov/formsdocs/wp/P715.pdf>. 
61. United States Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division - We Can Help, online: 
<http://www.dol.gov/wecanhelp/>. Although this example involves collaborations between 
(2013) 50 osgoode Hall law Journal864
Outreach campaigns by government agencies are also undertaken by 
Australia’s Fair Work Ombudsman. Such campaigns typically involve audits 
of sectors or industries in which worker complaints are high or rising. After 
conducting a review revealing that 4,006 complaints pertaining to Australia’s 
new National Employment Standards had been lodged by administration support 
officers between 2008 and 2010 and that clerical workers made 11,459 enquiries 
with the Fair Work Ombudsman between January 2010 and May 2011, the 
Ombudsman undertook a national audit of a segment of clerical workers. In addition 
to an education and compliance phase, this audit involved first seeking records of 
administration employees’ time and wages for assessment against the Fair Work 
Act, its regulation, and the relevant industrial instrument (i.e., Clerks - Private 
Sector Award 201062). A total of 1,621 businesses were then inspected, resulting 
in the recovery of $171,024 in wages and entitlements for 280 employees.63
Enforcement activities responsive to workers’ complaints can also extend 
beyond the purview of government labour agencies to include joint initiatives 
with other agencies. This tactic is already operational in the United Kingdom, 
where the creation of the Pay and Work Rights Helpline aims to streamline access 
to the five enforcement bodies charged with employment rights and related leg-
islation—Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs; the Employment Agencies Standards 
inspectorate; the Department for the Environment; Food and Rural Affairs, the Health 
and Safety Executive; and the Gangmasters Licensing Authority. Under this model, 
operators answering calls are trained about these enforcement bodies’ responsi-
bilities and are able to refer cases to the relevant body or bodies. Indeed, as the 
report of the Low Pay Commission notes: 
[O]ften, cases have to be referred to more than one enforcement body – for ex-
ample, HMRC [Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs] and EAS [Employment Agen-
cies Standards inspectorate]. This has had a beneficial knock-on effect as the various 
collectively-oriented community organizations (from which it also accepts independent 
referrals) and state agencies, I place “We Can Help” in the category of initiatives supporting 
individuals because it focuses on improving access to the complaints process for individual 
workers belonging to marginalized communities.
62. Commonwealth of Australia, Fair Work Commission, MA000002 - Clerks-Private Sector 
Award 2010 (19 December 2008), online: <http://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/modern_
awards/award/ma000002/default.htm>.
63. Commonwealth of Australia, Fair Work Ombudsman, National Clerical Workers Campaign 
2011: Final Report – June 2012, online: <http://www.fairwork.gov.au/campaignresults/
National/National-Clerical-Workers-Campaign-Report.pdf>. For a review of other efforts by 
the Fair Work Ombudsman to engage with unions and workers, see Tess Hardy, “Enrolling 
non-state actors to improve compliance with minimum employment standards” (2011) 22:3 
Econ & Lab Rel Rev 117.
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enforcement bodies have had to collaborate on multi-issue complaints and have, as 
a result, considered joint investigations where possible.64
Such coordinative initiatives facilitate voice, as they recognize that workers 
attempting to access complaint mechanisms in one area often need other 
kinds of support. They are also attuned to the relationship between employment 
status and form of employment, on the one hand, and various types of structural 
disadvantage impeding labour market membership, on the other hand.
B. innOVatiOnS SUPPORting WORkERS’ cOLLEctiVE VOicE
In addition to the range of possible means to support individual workers in 
situations calling for the use of complaints machinery, there are also a growing 
number of initiatives that give groups of workers voice in the enforcement process. 
1. MULTIaGeNCY PRoaCTIve eNfoRCeMeNT
In the United States in particular, the use of proactive investigations is becoming 
increasingly prominent as a first order strategy in high-risk sectors to draw 
out workers’ collective experiences where they are otherwise unlikely to bring 
forward individual complaints. For example, in 2011, the US Department of 
Labor, as part of its new plan/prevent/protect agenda, initiated an enforcement 
sweep focusing on the bottom of the “fissured”65 pyramid of production in the 
agricultural industry. Beginning in south Florida and continuing up the east coast, 
the sweep was intended to increase compliance and inform workers of their rights 
under several core pieces of legislation (e.g., the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural 
Worker Protection Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act’s Field Sanitation Standard).66 By June of that year, inspectors 
64. United Kingdom, National Minimum Wage: Low Pay Commission Report 2011 (Presented to 
Parliament by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation & Skills, April 2011) at 108, 
online: <http://www.lowpay.gov.uk/lowpay/report/pdf/Revised_Report_PDF_with_April_
date.pdf>. 
65. In his work on enforcing labour standards in the United States, David Weil uses the term 
“fissured” to describe the expanding number of industries characterized by large low-
wage segments whereby lead companies, which together shape product market conditions 
affecting workers’ wages and conditions of employment, are effectively separated from the 
actual employment of workers. See David Weil, “Enforcing Labour Standards in Fissured 
Workplaces: The US Experience” (2011) 22:2 Econ & Lab Rel Rev 33 at 34-36. In analyzing 
the organization of agricultural production, this term is a suitable descriptor given the 
complex contracting arrangements characterizing this sector. 
66. The weakness of this strategy is that it fails to reach up to firms at the top of the chain, 
which set terms that condition the employment relationships and standards in the most 
highly competitive parts of this labour market (i.e., at the bottom). This limitation calls for 
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had conducted over twenty investigations, recovered $670,770 in back wages for 
approximately six hundred agricultural workers, and assessed over $128,850 in 
penalties, finding violations such as “paying workers less than the federal mini-
mum wage, and paying workers at packing sheds who did not qualify for the Fair 
Labor Standards Act’s agricultural exemption “straight time” for all hours worked, 
rather than time and one-half their regular rates of pay for overtime work hours 
as required.”67 This sweep involved sending teams of investigators to fields and 
packing houses to assess compliance by “facility owners, growers, farm labor con-
tractors and all other business entities associated with these agricultural operations. 
Thorough inspections of transportation, field sanitation facilities, employment 
practices and pay records [were] conducted to ensure compliance.”68 A central 
component of the department’s surveillance activities involved interviewing 
workers at multiple sites simultaneously, presumably to avoid situations in 
which fear of reprisal could mount, with numerous investigators covering large 
areas on the same day and involving departmental lawyers early in preparing 
cases for future litigation.69 
embedding the US Department of Labor’s tactic of using sweeps in a strategy of liability 
between top and bottom.
67. United States Department of Labor, News Release, “US Labor Department’s Initiative in 
South Florida Results in Nearly $800,000 in Back Wage and Fines for Violations Affecting 
about 590 Farmworkers” (27 June 2011), online: <http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/
whd/whd20110845.htm>. 
68. Ibid. 
69. Other more direct examples of measures targeted to industries in the United States include 
focussed inspections, undertaken by the DOL’s Wage and Hour Division, in industries 
beyond those mentioned in the plan/prevent/protect agenda, such as gas stations and 
restaurants. For example, in 2011, after recovering $1.2 million in back wages for almost 
four hundred employees at one hundred New Jersey gas stations and finding them “rife with 
violative pay practices such as paying workers a flat salary or ‘straight time’ wages for all 
hours,” the Wage and Hour Division launched a state-wide initiative involving investigations 
at randomly chosen gas stations to educate operators about their obligation to pay the 
minimum wage and overtime requirements under the Fair Labor Standards Act. See Harold 
Brubaker, “Feds Target Wages at N.J. Gas Stations,” Philly.com (23 April 2011), online: 
<http://articles.philly.com/2011-04-23/business/29466702_1_minimum-wage-gas-stations-
fair-labor-standards-act>. A similar measure, known as a “neighborhood sweep,” involving 
labour officials at the state level, and focussing geographically on restaurants in Ithaca, New 
York, found 77 per cent of those visited to be violating New York State labour laws in 2009. 
See New York State Department of Labor, News Release, “Targeted Labor Department 
Investigation Finds Ithaca Restaurant Workers Victimized by Wage Theft” (10 December 
2009), online: <http://www.labor.ny.gov/pressreleases/2009/December10_2009.htm>. 
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2. CoMMUNITY-BaseD eNfoRCeMeNT
Innovative community-based practices are also emerging in which workers’ advocates 
and unions are involved in documenting and redressing violations, and thereby in 
discerning common patterns of noncompliance. Empowering workers by enabling 
their chosen representatives to work systematically towards improved compliance, the 
most institutionalized of those practices are also based in the United States. Examples 
include the well-documented and ongoing deputization programs created by the 
Los Angeles Unified School District and the Los Angeles Board of Public Work-
ers.70 Under the first program, the Los Angeles Unified School District deputizes 
and trains representatives of building trades unions to enforce the prevailing wage on 
district projects funded by monies from construction bonds. These representatives are 
known as “work preservation volunteers”71 and are provided with badges and business 
cards and authorized to enter school sites to conduct compliance visits. This program 
arose from a controversial agreement in which construction unions conceded their 
right to strike over job issues in exchange for the creation of an internal compli-
ance department by the School District enabling union representatives to conduct 
compliance visits. The Los Angeles Board of Public Workers followed suit, training 
what it calls compliance group representatives. Both programs are designed to make 
these on-the-ground inspectors the representatives of labour inspectors from the City 
and thereby expand the City’s enforcement capacity while simultaneously provid-
ing workers and their advocates with greater voice. Compliance representatives’ 
duties include interviewing employees about hours, wages, job classification, 
and official duties, as well as problems at work more generally. They also assist 
workers in filling out forms in the complaint process when they perceive through 
their investigatory efforts that violations have taken place. They do not, however, 
determine violations or assess penalties. Under both programs, representatives 
are retrained every year. They are not permitted to use their activities to gather 
information for their unions, disparage non-union contractors, or review 
project data outside a pending complaint. Rather, their role is to mimic the 
neutral labour inspector.
These examples represent the strongest version of what Janice Fine and 
Jennifer Gordon call community-based enforcement in operation (i.e., enabling 
civil society groups to deliver information and education, patrol communities, 
70. Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, “Strengthening Labor Standards Enforcement through 
Partnerships with Workers’ Organizations” (2010) 38:4 Pol & Soc’y 552.
71. Ibid at 563. 
(2013) 50 osgoode Hall law Journal868
file and investigate complaints, and provide ongoing deterrents).72 Program 
strengths include their relative permanence and their enshrinement in public law. 
Weaknesses include deputies’ inability to advocate for workers facing violation 
and/or evasive behaviour. Both programs also follow David Weil’s prescription 
for regulatory jujitsu:73 their substantive success flows from the business represen-
tatives’ intimate understanding of sector-based issues, their aligning the contours 
of their activities to specific rules applicable to public construction, and their 
access to detailed data.74
3. PaRTNeRshIPs BeTWeeN sTaTe aGeNCIes aND CoMMUNITY 
oRGaNIZaTIoNs
Still another example of community-based enforcement that holds promise as 
a model is New York’s former Wage and Hour Watch, which entailed a formal 
partnership between New York’s labour department and six agencies including 
workers’ centres and unions. This arrangement involved a time-limited memo-
randum of agreement (signed in 2009) in which the participating organizations 
72. Ibid at 558-60. 
73. David Weil, “A Strategic Approach to Labour Inspection” (2008) 147:4 Int’l Lab Rev 349 at 
372.
74. Although it is less institutionalized, another example of community-based enforcement 
drawn from the United States where workers gain voice is the Maintenance Cooperation 
Trust Fund, a janitorial watchdog involving a California local of the Service Employees 
International Union (Local 1877) and lead contractors engaged in collective agreements 
with that local. Together, these institutions established a trust fund whose mission is to 
abolish unfair business practices in this industry through education as well as investigating 
cleaning contractors’ conditions in order to enhance enforcement by public agencies and 
private attorneys. Signatory contractors pay between one and five cents per hour worked by 
workers to fund such programs, which require a staff of seven to cover the California area. 
This staff exposes, persuades, and will ultimately sue violators if they refuse to change. It also 
helps state agencies with fact-finding, brings workers to agencies to follow up, and supports 
workers engaged in private litigation. As part of its activities, the Maintenance Cooperation 
Trust Fund enters monitoring agreements with troublesome contractors and helps cultivate 
interagency monitoring. The main limitations of its activities, compared to the preceding 
examples, are twofold. First, firms can always choose alternative contractors whereas 
more traditional justice for janitors campaigns target worksites, and thus building tenants 
must comply with monitoring agreements rather than firms. Second, the Maintenance 
Cooperation Trust Fund is not capable of making lasting change inside state agencies because 
such agencies are not involved directly as partners. See Catherine K Ruckelshaus, “Labor’s 
Wage War” (2008) 35 Fordham Urb LJ 373 at 391-94; Karina Muñiz, “The Janitorial 
Industry and the Maintenance Cooperation Trust Fund” in Ruth Milkman, Joshua Bloom 
& Victor Narro, eds, Working For Justice: The L.A. Model of Organizing and Advocacy (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2010) 211.
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agreed to identify and train at least six people to serve as Wage and Hour Watch 
members for two years. These individuals, who were not deputized, were to 
provide at least two hundred businesses per year with labour law compliance 
information, hold sessions for the public, and refer potential labour law violations 
to the labour department. They were not authorized to carry out inspections. They 
thereby functioned like “neighbourhood watch” applied to the labour standards 
domain. Consequently, the chief strengths of the model are that it fosters ongoing 
partnerships between the state enforcement bureaucracy and community groups 
and preserves the ability of the latter to advocate for workers.75
One successful example of New York Wage and Hour Watch in action, 
predating its codification, was the 2007 investigation of a commercial strip in 
Bushwick, Brooklyn. This investigation involved a particularly dynamic approach 
as it brought the Labor Department’s Division of Labor Standards together with 
its Bureau of Immigrant Workers’ Rights in partnering with the Retail, Wholesale 
and Department Store Union and Make the Road New York, which, in working 
collaboratively, found $350,000 of underpayments owed to sixty workers. After 
this determination, the two community agencies remained active in the area, 
informing businesses and workers about labour law, resulting in increased com-
pliance, and contributing to a greater sense of community membership amongst 
workers highly dependent upon minimum labour standards.76
iV. REMEdYing thE EnfORcEMEnt cRiSiS in OntaRiO: 
LESSOnS fROM ELSEWhERE
Considering the existing array of initiatives emergent in other common law 
jurisdictions, what options are available for altering Ontario’s ES regime to begin 
to counter the tendency to place enforcement in individual workers’ hands? How 
might workers reliant on the ESA and their advocates have a stronger voice in its 
enforcement? Since almost all regulatory regimes rely on a mix of approaches and 
methods, Ontario’s system could be improved by drawing insights from both the 
individual and collective voice mechanisms canvassed here.
75. For a detailed assessment of New York’s Wage and Hour Watch Program and the roots of the 
demise of this partnership, see Janice Fine, “Solving the Problem from Hell: Tripartism as a 
Strategy for Addressing Labor Standards Non-Compliance in the United States” (2013) 50:4 
Osgoode Hall LJ 813.
76. New York State Department of Labor, News Release, “Labor Department Initiative 
Empowers Ordinary People To Join The Fight Against Wage Theft” (26 January 2009), 
online: <http://www.labor.ny.gov/pressreleases/2009/Jan26_2009.htm>. 
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a. aUgMEnting WORkERS’ indiVidUaL VOicES UndER thE 
cOMPLaint-BaSEd SYStEM 
At a policy level, it is critical to recognize that an onerous and risky complaints 
process requiring the precariously employed to play the protagonist77 works 
against the exercise of voice. Maximizing the accessibility of the complaints 
process, and supports once it is accessed, is therefore necessary.
The foremost failings of Ontario’s ES enforcement system relate to the onus 
placed on individual workers to initiate and proceed through arduous claims 
processes, made more complex by the additional requirements (since 2010) that 
the claimant confront his or her employer about perceived violations and provide 
certain information in writing before he or she is permitted to make a formal 
claim. To maximize effective routes to individual claims-making and reduce its 
associated risks to workers, the involvement of outside parties and external sup-
ports is critical in this context.  Rather than making the complaints process more 
onerous, the ES enforcement regime could provide for anonymous and third-par-
ty complaints to initiate investigations and limit the potential for reprisals against 
workers whose rights are in question, changes which could be achieved largely 
through the straightforward adaptation of administrative measures. Here, the 
anonymous complaints process operating in Saskatchewan and the third-party 
complaints permissible in Australia offer preferable models. On the assumption 
that complaints may be shared among workers, in such situations Ontario could 
also follow Saskatchewan’s lead and pursue expanded investigations.
Permitting anonymous and third-party complaints does not, however, 
resolve deficiencies in the support available to workers in the complaints process. 
Workers making claims under the Health and Safety, Workplace Safety and 
Insurance, and Human Rights regimes are eligible for significant supports from 
Occupational Health and Safety Clinics for Ontario Workers, the Office of the 
Workers’ Advisor, and the Human Rights Legal Support Centre, respectively. 
Enhanced supports, ideally through devoting greater financial resources to legal 
aid, are necessary for the ES enforcement regime to function effectively, and for ES-
dependent workers not only to be deemed to be full members of the labour market 
in laws on the books but to be able to exercise their voice and participate in practice. 
Timely person-to-person support in the claims process is especially key given the 
six month time limit on claims-making and since studies of other jurisdictions 
(e.g., British Columbia) show that the self-help model undercuts worker claims-
making altogether. To buoy such measures, relecting New York state’s wage-theft 
77. Tucker, “Old Lessons for New Governance,” supra note 10 at 27. 
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legislation, the creation of an effective presumption of employer retaliation is also 
important. This would involve boosting the current onus of proof under Ontario’s 
ESA78 through measures of interim reinstatement during claims investigation for 
workers fired for seeking their ES entitlements, establishing meaningful fines 
in cases of documented reprisal, and expanding the circumstances under which 
worker protections against retaliation apply as well as the actors that may be 
deemed to be engaging in retaliatory behavior.79
In the complaints process, third-party representation of the sort possible in 
Australia offers another direction that Ontario could take. This sort of represen-
tation is crucial to the expression of individual voice and could contribute to 
augmenting workers’ collective voice by, among other things, spawning new or 
supporting existing institutions (e.g., unions) devoted to workers’ realization of 
their rights. Furthermore, there is no principled reason that third-party repre-
sentation should be a feature of some pieces of labour legislation and not others. 
Assistance through the complaints process, as well as outreach of the sort that 
labour inspectorates in other jurisdictions pursue in partnership with community 
organizations, would also make such representation more meaningful. So, too, 
would greater interagency coordination, that is, the facilitation of links between 
different government agencies, in a range of related areas where a worker may be 
in a position to complain (e.g., Occupational Health and Safety, Human Rights, 
Employment Standards, et cetera). Such coordination has the potential to deliver 
fair compensation to workers if collections are simultaneously altered such that costs 
of enforcement shift to those that violate the law. Limited fines for employers and 
the financial burden of mounting a claim mute workers’ voices in the complaint pro-
cess, particularly the precariously employed, especially those facing other structural 
disadvantages such as migrant workers, for whom claims-making is also constrained 
by obligations to households and communities abroad. One potential remedy here 
is to require employers found in violation to cover administrative costs (e.g., costs of 
investigation). This could act as a deterrent against avoiding compensating workers 
for what they are genuinely owed.
78. ESA, supra note 1, s 74(2). 
79. For example, the New York state Wage Theft Prevention Act’s anti-retaliatory provisions 
are extended under the New York Labor Law. See New York Labor Law, c 31, art 7, § 215 
(McKinney 2010) (available on WL). 
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B. BEYOnd thE indiVidUaLiZEd MOdEL: PROSPEctS fOR cOLLEctiVE 
VOicE
Repairing the complaint-driven system alone is insufficient in increasing voice 
amongst ES-dependent workers. Greater avenues for collective action are required, 
involving a diversity of actors and institutions in enforcement. From this per-
spective, practices emergent in other common law jurisdictions confronting 
similar problems highlight two channels to pursue in particular.  
The first channel involves inventing new collaborations where workers’ desig-
nates (e.g., business agents from unions or representatives from entities supporting 
non-unionized workers such as workers’ centres) are either deputized to assist in 
enforcement or involved in other formal arrangements directed towards similar 
ends. Such initiatives offer particular promise in segments of the labour market 
characterized by high levels of violation or evasive behaviour on account of the 
presence of immigrants and young or women workers, whose social location may 
impede their ability to voice complaints as individuals. Although deputization is 
ideal under many circumstances, given the limits that it can place on the actions of 
workers’ advocates, collaboration between state inspectors and workers’ advocates to 
enforce ES rights may be desirable. Initiatives organized by geography, of the sort 
evolving under the former New York Wage and Hour Watch, offer strong examples. 
They go a considerable distance in bringing the culture of enforcement to the streets, 
in giving voice to collectives of workers in a given region or neighbourhood. 
Although little known, the MOL’s Administration Manual for Employment 
Standards (2010) provides a vehicle through which Ontario could pursue com-
munity-based enforcement initiatives of these sorts. It mandates the existence of 
an Employment Standards Program Advisory Committee, whose roles include 
monitoring “changing circumstances and emerging issues” and assisting “in the 
development of strategies and best practices to implement special projects.”80 To 
fulfill its mandate, the Employment Standards Program Advisory Committee is 
also to review “stakeholder concerns;”81 this committee thereby offers a potential 
mechanism for communicating with workers’ organizations and advocates in 
improving enforcement.82 Collectively, such provisions permit the committee 
to develop and advance initiatives augmenting the collective voice of workers 
in conjunction with diverse actors and institutions. 
80. MOL, Administration Manual, supra note 19, ss 1.5.3-1.5.4 [emphasis added].
81. Ibid, s 1.5.2.
82. Indeed, in its deliberations, the Employment Standards Program Advisory Committee is 
explicitly permitted to invite additional persons to attend meetings to provide information 
and participate in discussions. See ibid, s 1.5.7. 
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Another channel for increasing collective voice entails conducting regular en-
forcement sweeps of high-risk sectors of the sort undertaken by the US Department 
of Labor and expanded investigations carried out routinely in Saskatchewan. Both 
types of undertakings offer attractive models since they cover greater ground 
than the investigation of individual complaints and give workers voice by 
providing low risk opportunities for the expression of grievances. 
V. cOncLUSiOn
The lack of effective individual and collective voice mechanisms amongst workers 
dependent on ES as their primary source of labour protection hinders their access 
to formal rights and entitlements. By requiring workers, a sizeable subset of whom 
are precariously employed, not only to come forward with their own grievances but 
to prepare and present their own cases, often with limited foreseeable pecuniary 
benefits beyond obtaining entitlements that they are already owed, Ontario’s 
predominantly complaint-based system has a chilling effect. There are, how-
ever, other paths to follow. In other common law contexts, where conditions of 
work and employment have similarly deteriorated, there are a growing number 
of initiatives where the burden of enforcement does not rest predominantly on 
individual workers but is rather shared between different government agencies 
and external institutions. In such contexts, unions and community groups are 
increasingly playing supportive roles in knowledge-sharing about workers’ rights 
and taking on substantive responsibilities linked to representation, investigations, 
and settlements. In making necessary adaptations to Ontario’s ES enforcement 
regime, drawing from these examples of incremental change and especially their 
underlying principles could contribute to creating a context in which rights bearers 
have better access to meaningful remedies where collective improvements are also 
within closer reach. 

